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1. Introduction 
It is undisputed that colonial Korea experienced rapid industrialization during the 1930s. The 
reason researchers worldwide began focusing on the industrialization of colonial Korea is closely 
related to the emergence of the newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of Asia during the 1980s. 
Unlike the newly industrializing regions in Central and South America and Europe, the economies of 
the Asian states of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore survived two oil crises and achieved 
considerable growth during the 1980s.  
A series of studies has attempted to trace the source of these countries’ success to the legacy of the 
colonial era. In the case of Korea in particular, considerable attention has been given to the claim 
that the state-led growth under the Chung-Hee Park regime (1963-1979), which has been dubbed a 
developmental dictatorship, originated in Korea’s colonial administration under Japanese rule. 
Proponents of this view assert that Korea’s industrialization during the 1930s resulted from the 
industrial policy of the Governor-General of Korea (Eckert, 1991; Woo, 1991; Kohli, 1994). 
However, subsequent research has revealed that industrial policy of the Governor-General of Korea 
during the 1930s is a catchphrase with little substance (Kim, 2002).  
In light of the debate over the origins of Korean industrialization, interest has grown in case 
studies focusing on private capital such as companies and factories during the colonial era. These 
case studies have variously emphasized the positive and negative effects of the advance of Japanese 
firms into Korea. However, opinions are divided regarding whether industrialization during the 
colonial era included Korean-owned firms. One strand advocates that industrialization in the 1930s 
only benefited large-scale Japanese factories that advanced into Korea and delivered scant 
developmental benefits or even negative crowding-out effects to Korean-owned firms. This view is 
based on the fact that industrialization was driven by production to meet the Japanese military’s 
demand and lacked organic linkages with Korea’s industries and economy. The other strand asserts 
that industrialization in the 1930s was accompanied by the development of Korean factories, and in 
fact, the growth and number of Korean factories overtook those of Japanese factories owing to the 
creation and expansion of the industrial product market in Korea, led by the successful increase of 
agricultural exports.  
The debate is closely related to the literature on the spillover of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
indigenous firms. FDI is expected to increase productivity of indigenous firms and promote growth 
through externalities in the form of technology transfers. Foreign firms can also exert positive 
spillovers by stimulating demand through purchases and sales of intermediate goods (vertical 
linkages) and by creating new demand through exports (Markusen and Venables, 1999). FDI may 
also act as an incubator for indigenous firms by enabling local employees to gain experience they 
can use to start their own businesses. On the other hand, foreign firms can negatively affect 
indigenous firms by crowding out inefficient firms or serving as an entry barrier by stealing the 
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market with their advantages over technology, capital, and marketing abilities. Indigenous firms in 
developing countries face higher risks of being driven out by foreign firms as the technology gap is 
greater (Caves, 1996; Blomstrom, Kokko, and Zejen, 2000).  
Empirical examinations of FDI’s entry or exit spillovers are scarce compared with the sizeable 
literature on productivity spillovers 1 . The limited quantitative evidence indicates a positive 
correlation between FDI, represented by presence or entry of foreign firms, and domestic entry. Görg 
and Strobl (2002), De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003), and Ayyagari and Kosová (2010) find positive 
entry spillovers in Ireland, Belgium, and the Czech Republic, respectively. On the other hand, Anwar 
and Sun (2012) find no overall entry spillover from foreign presence on domestic entry in China, but 
FDI from all countries except Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are positively correlated with the 
domestic entry rate. Evidence for the static (instantaneous) effect of foreign entry is mixed; Görg and 
Strobl (2002) find a positive effect in Ireland, while De Backer and Sleuwaegen (2003) find a 
negative correlation in Belgium. In addition, Kosová (2010) finds a static crowding-out effect where 
foreign entry increases the exit rates of domestic firms.  
In this paper, we integrate these two distinct strands of the literature to answer the following 
question: Did Japanese direct investment during Korea’s colonial era suppress industrialization by 
Korean-owned firms? In particular, did the presence and penetration of Japanese factories discourage 
the entry of Korean factories? To answer this question, we investigate entry patterns of Korean 
factories by utilizing subsector–county-level panel data aggregated from the census of factories for 
1932, 1936, and 1940. We exploit variations in the share of Japanese factories and their entry rates 
across counties within the same subsector to determine if the entry of Korean factories was 
suppressed in counties with higher presence and entry of Japanese factories. To deal with concerns 
of omitted variable bias (i.e., unobserved subsector- or county-level factors that affect both Japanese 
presence or entry and Korean entry), we control for subsector and characteristics or include fixed 
effects for subsector–county, year, and subsector- and county-specific trends. 
We find that Korean entry rates were, in fact, higher in counties with a higher presence of 
Japanese factories: a 10 percentage point increase in the lagged share of Japanese factories increases 
entry rates of Korean factories by 9.1 percentage points on average, roughly doubling the figure 
from 0.116 to 0.207. As another measures, a 10 percentage point increase in the lagged share of 
Japanese factories increases the probability of Korean entry by 2.9 percentage points, an 11.6% 
increase from 24.9%. These results counter the view that the advance of Japanese factories had little 
benefit to or crowded out Korean factories. Instead, it suggests possible entry spillovers by the 
Japanese factories. Our intensive review of the case studies of some sectors indicates that there was 
                                                        
1 See Hanousek et al. (2011), Havranek and Irsova (2011), Irsova and Havranek (2013), and references therein for 
empirical studies on productivity spillovers of FDI. These papers provide recent meta-analyses of the empirical 
studies and conclude that horizontal spillovers (spillovers within a sector) are on average zero while spillover to 
suppliers is economically significant, whereas spillover to buyers is small.  
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considerable technology transfer from the Japanese factories and spin-offs by their Korean 
employees.  
This paper makes two main contributions. First, we contribute to the debate on indigenous 
industrialization in 1930s Korea and, more generally, on the role of FDI in indigenous development. 
Although previous literature asserts the case for indigenous industrialization by showing that the 
number of Korean factories increased in the 1930s, it does not comprehensively investigate the 
effect of the advance of Japanese factories on Korean factories (Huh, 1993; Kim, 2002). We take a 
step further to examine more direct evidence regarding the relationship between Japanese direct 
investment and Korean industrialization and show that entry of Korean factories was more likely in 
counties with a higher number of Japanese incumbents. 
Our second contribution is an extension of the literature on entry spillovers from FDI. The current 
understanding relies on evidence from developed or transition countries such as Ireland, the Czech 
Republic, Belgium, and China, where the technological gap between foreign and indigenous firms 
seems to be moderate (Görg and Strobl, 2002; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003; Ayyagari and 
Kosová, 2010; Anwar and Sun, 2012). However, crowding-out or entry-barrier effects of FDI are 
expected to be larger in circumstances with substantial technological gaps. This paper studies an 
ideal case, wherein Korea was at a very early stage of industrialization and agriculture was its 
predominant industry; therefore, the Japanese factories that advanced into Korea enjoyed advantages 
of technology and scale accrued during the World War I boom. This case shows that FDI can serve 
as a catalyst for indigenous development, as Markusen and Venables (1999) suggest, even at a very 
early stage of economic development.  
We also differ from previous studies that examine the effects of FDI on local entry by considering 
regionally “local” spillovers. As these studies use industries as a unit of observation, they implicitly 
assume that the spillover would be exhibited over the entire country. However, competitions or 
spillovers may only affect factories locally, as Aitken and Harrison (1999) suggest, especially in 
developing economies with limited transportation and information infrastructures. Thus, we take 
local spillovers into account by examining entry patterns at the city–county level.  
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the historical background of 
industrialization and Japanese direct investments in Korea during the 1930s. Section 3 discusses the 
benefits and drawbacks of the advance of Japanese capital into Korean factories. Section 4 describes 
the specification and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses and interprets 
the empirical findings with historical anecdotes focusing on certain sectors. Section 7 concludes.  
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2. Industrialization in Korea in the 1930s 
2.1. Trend of Korean industrialization  
It is clear that colonial Korea achieved rapid industrialization in the 1930s. Under Japanese rule, 
colonial Korea experienced remarkable expansion in manufacturing. As Figure 1 shows, 
manufacturing accounted for 15% of total output in 1918, 26% in 1930, 30% in 1935, and 41% by 
1940. Even though the Korean economy remained predominantly agricultural in the 1940s, 
manufacturing had become comparable with the agricultural sector (Kim, 2002: 128). The number of 
factories continually increased from the time Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 until 1940, and 
the number of Korean-owned factories surpassed that of Japanese-owned factories by the mid-1920s, 
with the gap increasing in the 1930s (Figure 2)2. However, due care should be taken when 
interpreting this data. It is important to note that most large factories were owned by Japanese, and 
most Korean factories were small to medium sized. 
 
== Figure 1. Share of sectors in total output == 
 
== Figure 2. Number of factories == 
 
Korea’s industrialization in the 1930s had certain specific features. The proportion of primary 
industries gradually declined in the 1930s, whereas manufacturing and mining became significant 
sectors. In particular, heavy and chemical industries grew rapidly, and their total output overtook that 
of light industries by around 1940. Many domestic industries were transformed into modern factories, 
which used mechanized equipment, electric power, and a relatively large labor force. The output of 
traditional industries, which was 40.5% of total output until 1933, sharply dropped to 21.9% in 1939. 
Moreover, as commerce and trade were boosted in the 1930s, the gap in commodity prices, interest 
rates, and wages decreased throughout the country, and business cycles developed in near perfect 
unison between Japan and colonial Korea (Huh, 1996: 181-182). 
 
2.2. Japanese direct investment in Korea  
Much of Korea’s industrialization during the 1930s was sparked by the influx of Japanese capital, 
which rose sharply during the late 1910s, a period of entrepreneurial boom. Since the Company Law, 
which restricted company start-ups, was incrementally eased after World War I, direct investment 
from Japan was considerable, and many Japanese-owned firms were established in Korea 
(Kobayashi, 1994: 207-213.) However, this investment boom was only temporary, and from the 
1920s onward, direct investment from Japanese firms stagnated considerably (Kaneko, 1986: 59).  
                                                        
2 The increase in factories was most striking during the 1930s. From 1930 to 1933, the number of Korean factories 
increased by 77%, and Japanese factories also increased by 31%. The proportion of Korean to Japanese factories 
significantly increased, with the former being as much as 63% more in 1938 (Joo, 1996: 135.) 
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Direct investment of Japanese capital rose again during the late 1920s, after a handful of 
pioneering Japanese firms moved into Korea. In 1926, the Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company set 
up the Korea Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company, and in 1927, it established the Korea Hydroelectric 
Power Company3. The advance of the Japan Nitrogenous Fertilizer Company encouraged other 
Japanese firms to increase direct investment in Korea. Consequently, a diverse range of Japanese 
capital investment began entering Korea in the late 1920s, such as the Mitsui Group (the Nanboku 
Cotton Company, Gunze Textiles, Toyo Textiles, and Onoda Cement Corporation), the Mitsubishi 
Group (Chosun Heavy Industries), the Nichimen Group (Chosun Cotton, Jeollanam-do Textiles), the 
Kanebo Group (Kanegafuchi Spinning), the Katakura Group (Katakura Textiles), and the Asano 
Group (Asano Cement). 
The advance of Japanese firms into Korea gathered momentum during the 1930s. According to the 
Long-term Economic Statistics (LTES) estimates shown in Figure 3, the total annual Japanese 
investment into Korea prior to 1927 (excluding 1920 and 1923) never rose above 100 million yen4. 
However, the value surpassed the 100 million yen mark in 1928, and continued rising to 200 million 
in 1933 and 300 million in 1937. The rise in investment into Korea was particularly striking during 
1934-1940 (Mizoguchi, 1988: 298), and the nature of investments also changed. Much of the 
Japanese capital that flowed into Korea until the 1920s was state capital and large-scale capital, but 
the balance shifted considerably toward industrial capital from the 1930s onward, including small- to 
medium-scale private capital (Ahn, 1990: 102).  
 
== Figure 3. Total annual Japanese investment into Korea == 
 
There are two probable reasons for the substantial increase in the inflow of Japanese capital into 
Korea in the 1930s5. First, as a result of the consecutive depressions of the late 1920s and early 
1930s, the liberal policy regime of the 1920s became discredited and state interventionism gained 
momentum in Japan (Cha, 2003: 131). In response to the financial crisis of 1927 and the Showa 
Depression of 1930-1931, the Japanese government introduced the Major Industry Control Act in 
1931, which resulted in many Japanese firms building their factories in colonial Korea to avoid 
                                                        
3 The sum of these two companies’ capital was the third largest in Korea, behind the Bank of Korea and the Korea 
Railway Company. In 1927, both companies began building factories and power plants, and in 1929, the Korea 
Nitrogenous Fertilizer Factory was founded in Hǔngnam, and a hydropower plant was completed on the Bujeon River. 
In the 1930s, following in the footsteps of these companies, other large Japanese companies successively built 
modern textile, chemical, and cement factories in the Korean Peninsula (Lee and Park, 1998: 28). 
4 Japanese scholars at Hitotsubashi University engaged in LTES between 1967 and 1989. In this project, Yuzo 
Yamamoto estimated the amounts of Japanese annual investments in Korea. 
5 On the other hand, we can highlight three traditional explanations of the inflow of Japanese capital into Korea. The 
first is that the Great Depression caused a dramatic drop in profits across all industries and led to the accumulation of 
surplus capital that sought outlets of investment, and some of this capital found an outlet in Korea. The second 
explanation is that in Korea, the factors of production were low compared with those in Japan. The third explanation 
is that Korea had fewer economic restrictions than Japan and thus served as a haven for capital (Ahn, 1990: 103-104.) 
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Japan’s rigid government controls on production and sales6. Second, colonial Korea was becoming 
an attractive marketplace for Japanese entrepreneurs during the 1930s owing to factors including 
inexpensive power supply, cheap labor force, and the Governor-General’s provision of financing and 
tax-based support.  
Examining the details of Japanese capital investments during this period, heavy and chemical 
industries are predominant with 90% of the market share, largely comprising electronics, chemicals, 
iron, and light metals. On the other hand, the proportion of machinery-equipment manufacturing was 
relatively low. With regard to total assets, large-scale capital represented a high proportion of total 
assets, and the development of middle-scale chemical industries in the 1930s was led by large-scale 
direct investment by a few Japanese large-scale businesses. With the exception of certain industries 
such as the spinning industry, many Japanese-owned factories that engaged in light industry were 
based on small to medium-scale capital; therefore, they engaged in close competition with 
Korean-owned factories (Huh, 1996: 195-197). 
 
2.3. Start-ups and growth of Korean factories  
The direct investments by these Japanese firms into Korea spurred the industrialization of the 
country and resulted in many Korean start-ups. Whereas Japanese capital followed an increasing 
trend from the end of the 1920s onward, Korean capital began to rise rapidly only in the 1930s. As 
Figure 2 shows, the number of Korean-owned factories surpassed and greatly superseded that of 
Japanese-owned factories from the 1930s onward.  
Despite this increase, such activity was disproportionately weighted toward certain categories of 
industry, including rice-milling, liquor, and oil production industries. These three major industries 
accounted for 60% of all Korean-owned factories. Furthermore, a development gap existed between 
the modern and traditional sectors. As evidenced by machinery manufacturing, the knitting industry, 
and the flour-milling industry, the industries that developed successfully were modernized industries 
introduced from Japan. However, as evidenced by the ceramics, salt, and wadding industries, more 
deeply traditional categories of industry experienced a relatively striking decline7. In addition, the 
degree of development differed depending on the factory’s scale: the growth of medium-sized 
factories with a regular workforce of 50-200 people was remarkable, compared with that of larger 
factories with a workforce of more than 200 people (Huh, 1993: 134). 
Korean capital not only grew in factories with five or more regular employees but also saw 
                                                        
6 The industrial policy implemented by Kazusige Ugaki, the Governor-General of colonial Korea from June 1931 to 
August 1936, focused on encouraging Japanese entrepreneurs to invest in colonial Korea and granting a favorable 
environment for capital movement (Kim, 2003: 34-35). Takeo Suzuki (1942: 93-95) described Ugaki’s policies as 
“Ugaki Liberalism” and presented the industrialization of colonial Korea, as initiated by Japanese capital, as the 
Korean industrial revolution. 
7 However, a handful of these business categories, such as the silk fabrics industry, which involved small-scale 
factories based on a foundation of handicraft manufacturing, were late in upgrading to new technologies. Therefore, 
their number continued to rise into the 1930s. 
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considerable growth among cottage industries, which were not included in the statistics if they had 
fewer than five workers. The output of cottage industries represented more than 60% of the total 
industrial output in 1923, but this proportion fell steadily to 23% in 1938. However, this does not 
imply that the scale of production contracted. In fact, real production levels increased, and cottage 
industries continued to hold an important position in Korean industrial output until the 
Sino-Japanese War (Kim, 2002: 130). The main products produced in household businesses were 
soybean paste, soy source, straw products, cotton fabrics, and hemp fabrics. While these products 
were initially intended for domestic consumption, many cottage industries successfully upgraded to 
factory industries by expanding their scale. During the 1930s, from all small-size Korean factories 
with a regular workforce of 5-50 people, between 30 and 50% were former cottage industries (Huh, 
1993: 147). 
 
 
3. Pros and cons of Japanese direct investment in Korea 
3.1. Entry spillovers of foreign firms  
FDI can be expected to have both positive and negative effects on entry and exit of indigenous 
firms (Markusen and Venables, 1999; Görg and Strobl, 2002; Ayyagari and Kosová, 2010; Anwar 
and Sun, 2012). On the positive side, first, foreign firms can generate technology spillovers that 
transfer advanced knowledge and technology to indigenous firms. This would ease the catch-up of 
indigenous firms, foster entry, and raise existing firms’ chances of survival. Second, foreign firms 
can act as incubators of indigenous firms and facilitate spin-offs by enabling local employees to gain 
experience before starting their own businesses. Third, foreign firms can create and expand demand: 
they might create new demand through exports of final products or generate additional demand for 
intermediate goods. Expansion of demand for intermediate goods would induce entry and survival of 
indigenous firms in upstream sectors. It can also facilitate entry in the downstream (final goods) 
sector by enabling access to cheap and high-quality inputs. Finally, although foreign firms might 
have strong competitive advantages over indigenous firms in the home-country or export market, 
indigenous firms are in a significantly better position to market locally. Therefore, in places where 
local markets are expanding, indigenous firms might outperform foreign firms after catching up 
technically.  
On the negative side, foreign firms might serve as an entry barrier for indigenous firms. In general, 
in comparison with indigenous firms, foreign firms have advanced skills and technology, abundant 
capital, and strong networks of suppliers and buyers in the home country. These characteristics 
enable foreign firms to enjoy higher productivity, better product quality, and easier access to the 
export market. Hence, foreign firms may have a competitive advantage over indigenous firms and 
may crowd them out through increased competition. Acknowledging the competitiveness of foreign 
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firms, indigenous entrepreneurs might abandon their own business start-ups. Moreover, if production 
by foreign firms lacks organic linkages with upstream or downstream sectors, then the demand 
creation effect through vertical spillovers will be limited.  
 
3.2. Military-demand-oriented vs. market-oriented industrialization 
Two main viewpoints have emerged regarding the effects of the influx of Japanese firms into 
Korea. The first sees Korea’s industrialization in the 1930s as a part of “military-demand-oriented 
industrialization” (hereafter “military industrialization theory”). This theory asserts that Korea’s 
industrialization during the 1930s focused on producing military supplies against the backdrop of 
Japan’s invasion of China after the 1931 Mukden Incident ,Second Sino-Japanese War and Pacific 
War (known as the “Fifteen-Year War”) (Kobayashi, 1967, 1975, 2012). Since Korean 
industrialization was deemed to serve military demand, the military industrialization theory 
considers that Korean industrialization had a “dual structure” and lacked an organic connection with 
the country’s internal situation. It only benefited the Japanese-owned firms that had advanced into 
Korea and only developed as an enclave economy, delivering little developmental benefit to 
Korean-owned firms. 
Academic research stressing the dual structure of Korean industrialization emphasizes the 
negative effects of the advance of Japanese firms into Korea. Kajimura (1977) argued that capital 
and technology gaps existed between Japanese and Korean firms and that Korean-owned factories 
existed only in peripheral areas which Japanese-owned factories had not penetrated. Similarly, Suh 
(1978) argued that Korea’s industrialization simply represented the injection of Japanese capital into 
the peninsula and that there was no link between Korean capital and industries. Accordingly, the 
advance of Japanese firms into Korea led to the decline of many Korean cottage industries and small 
businesses and further reduced employment opportunities in the industrial sector. Haggard, Kang, 
and Moon (1997) also pointed out that scarcely any connection existed between the modern sector, 
represented by Japanese-owned factories, and the traditional sector, represented by Korean-owned 
factories. They concluded that industrialization in Korea during the 1930s was not related to Korea’s 
economic growth or the improvement of Korean living standards. Most recently, Huh (2005) argues 
that the industrial growth process in Korea was simply that of large-scale capital that had advanced 
into the country from Japan. According to Huh, 80% of the industrial output during the 1930s came 
from factory manufacturing industries, and only 20% originated in cottage industries. Furthermore, 
one-third of the output of factory manufacturing industries came from factories based on large-scale 
capital from Japan. Many Korean-owned factories were cottage industries, and many factory-led 
manufacturing industries were small to medium sized. The Japanese-owned factories overwhelmed 
Korean-owned ones in terms of production scale and technology, and as there was little prospect of 
building up human capital, the ethnicity-based economic disparity grew increasingly wider.  
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The second view regards Korea’s industrialization during the 1930s as being market led rather 
than state led. Hori (1995) argues that during the 1930s, Korean consumption of mass-produced 
goods was increasing, and the Korean market for industrial products was gradually expanding. In the 
case of cotton spinning and ammonium sulfate, demand expanded as a result of direct investment by 
Japanese firms, and for the rayon industry, demand was created by Japanese imports. Direct 
investment by Japanese firms and imports of Japanese goods not only substituted Korea’s 
self-sufficient consumption economy but also created new demand. This continuous market 
expansion attracted further Japanese capital and goods, and many Korean firms were also stimulated 
by this phenomenon. A conspicuous number of Korean firms appeared in industries such as rayon 
textiles, liquor production, and fishmeal production. 
On the other hand, Kim (2002), another researcher emphasizing the role of the market, argued that 
expansion of the industrial products market in Korea during the 1930s resulted from Korean 
agriculture becoming an export industry, which had in turn occurred as a result of the successful 
Plan for Increased Rice Production in the 1920s8. The large volumes of rice exports to mainland 
Japan increased farmers’ incomes and led to an expansion of the consumer market for industrial 
goods. The expansion of the domestic market led to an increase in imports of industrial goods from 
Japan as well as stimulated the development of import-substitution industrialization by both 
Japanese- and Korean-owned factories in Korea. Thus, while the rise in demand was dependent on 
imports of consumer goods during the early stages of industrialization, demand continued to grow 
owing to direct investment by Japanese capital and the establishment of new Korean firms. 
According to this market-oriented view, direct investment by Japanese firms in Korea had both 
positive and negative effects on the growth of Korean firms. It led to the decline of some indigenous 
capital that lacked competitiveness; however, amid this upheaval, other Korean firms prevailed 
against the severe competition, and some even developed to the extent that they overwhelmed the 
Japanese firms. 
 
3.3. Heterogeneity of spillovers between industries 
How should we understand the two-sided impact brought about by the direct investment of 
Japanese capital? Joo (1996) classifies this direct investment into three categories. The first 
comprises firms that exported intermediate goods to the Japanese market, including those involved 
in deseeded cotton production, the paper manufacturing industry, and the iron industry. The second 
category consists of firms that supplied consumer goods to the Korean market, including those 
involved in the spinning and weaving, sugar manufacturing, flour-milling, and cement industries. 
The third category includes firms that exported consumer goods to the Japanese market, such as the 
                                                        
8 These plans aimed at the expansion of rice production by introducing improved seed types, increasing fertilizer 
input, and securing a stable water supply (Cha, 1998: 732). 
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silk industry (Joo, 1996: 123). 
Of these industries, the negative effects were most strongly felt in industries that required 
large-scale capital investment, such as the iron, paper manufacturing, sugar manufacturing, and 
cement industries. Korean-owned factories faced high entry barriers created by capital and 
technology gaps between Japanese- and Korean-owned factories, and as a result, barely any 
Korean-owned factories made any headway. In other words, the influx of large-scale Japanese 
capital was accompanied by a powerful entry-barrier effect. However, the advance of Japanese 
capital into these industries was not necessarily the only factor that drove the Korean firms away. As 
a result of having insufficient levels of capital and technology, few Korean-owned factories appeared 
in these sectors prior to the influx of Japanese capital; thus, any crowding-out effect on 
Korean-owned factories was limited. In the case of the textile industry, however, because it 
originally existed in Korea as a traditional industry, traditional Korean-owned factories were driven 
out by Japanese-owned factories. Thus, the textile industry suffered from an obvious crowding-out 
effect as well as an entry-barrier effect9.  
On the other hand, in cases of small- to medium-scale Japanese capital investment, negative 
effects were frequently outweighed by positive effects such as market expansion, technology 
spillovers, spin-offs, and vertical linkages. The liquor, knitting, and rubber industries developed 
against the backdrop of an expanding domestic market, while the silk and rice-milling industries 
developed in the context of the emergence of new export markets. All these industries were based on 
sectors that had traditionally existed in Korea but had undergone modernization, and innovation 
brought about by technology introduced from Japan played a crucial role in this modernization. The 
number of spin-offs, which involved Korean workers employed in Japanese-owned factories 
becoming independent and setting up their own factories, was particularly striking in the rice-milling, 
knitting, and rubber industries. There were also many cases of vertical linkages, in which 
Japanese-owned factories collaborated with Korean-owned factories and developed together10. 
Historical documents confirm the concurrent existence of industries that reflected both the 
positive and negative effects of Japanese capital in Korea. Generally, studies that consider the 
influence of Japanese capital in Korea as having a dual structure use industries that are 
conspicuously negative examples as case studies, whereas studies that focus on the role of the 
market use industries that highlight the positive effects. Regardless, a limit exists as to the extent to 
which case studies can show the true nature of industrialization in Korea during the 1930s. Thus, a 
quantitative analysis is needed, to which we turn in the following sections. 
                                                        
9 Direct investment by Japanese textile firms in Korea stimulated the establishment of new Korean-owned factories. 
However, as the scale of textile capital increased, this positive effect was outweighed by the fact that many Korean 
capitalists were effectively driven out of the market (Joo, 1996: 123). 
10 More specifically, Korean-owned factories produced intermediate goods and supplied them to Japanese-owned 
factories that produced the end products, or vice versa. Examples of this include the hulling industry, which supplied 
the rice-milling industry; the silk industry, which supplied the silk fabrics industry; and the sardine oil manufacturing 
industry, which supplied the machine oil manufacturing industry. 
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4. Estimation strategy and data 
4.1. Specifications and methodology 
To examine the effect of Japanese presence on Korean entry, we follow the estimation strategies 
of earlier literature by regressing the entry rate of Korean factories on the variables that capture the 
presence and entry of Japanese factories in the same subsector. However, we extend the analysis by 
exploiting variations in the presence and entry of Japanese factories across counties within the 
subsector rather than variation between subsectors. By employing subsectors as a unit of observation, 
previous studies implicitly assume that any spillovers of foreign presence affect all factories 
throughout the country. However, as Aitken and Harrison (1999) discuss, spillovers might only affect 
nearby factories. Our approach captures these local spillovers.  
Empirically, we regress variations of the following equation: 
 EntryRateKR𝑠𝑐𝑐 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1%Japanese𝑠𝑐𝑐−1 + 𝛽2EntryRateJP𝑠𝑐𝑐  +𝑋𝑠𝑐𝑐−1𝛾1 + 𝑋𝑠𝑐𝛾2 + 𝑋𝑐𝑐𝛾3 + 𝛿𝑠𝑐 + 𝑣𝑐 + 𝜀𝑠𝑐𝑐. (1) 
 
The gross entry rate of Korean factories (EntryRateKR𝑠𝑐𝑐), measured by the number of factories in 
subsector 𝑠 in county 𝑐 during period 𝑡 − 1 and 𝑡, is regressed on the following two variables 
that represent the presence and entry of Japanese factories in the same subsector–county. The lagged 
share of Japanese factories measured by the number of factories in the same subsector–county 
(%Japanese𝑠𝑐𝑐−1) represents presence, whereas the synchronous gross entry rate of Japanese 
factories in the same subsector–county (EntryRateJP𝑠𝑐𝑐) captures the static or instantaneous impact 
of the entry of Japanese factories on Korean entry. The coefficients of these variables, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, 
should be negative if the presence or entry of Japanese factories discourages the entry of Korean 
factories.  
As for controls, we include fixed effects for subsector–county 𝛿𝑠𝑐 and year 𝑣𝑐. The subsector–
county fixed effects eliminate time-invariant subsector–county effects that might influence both 
Korean entry and Japanese presence or entry. For example, factories might intensively enter rapidly 
growing subsectors; urban counties might nurture entry owing to agglomeration effects; and counties 
with more Japanese factories might be equipped with better infrastructure, thus facilitating entry of 
even more firms. The year fixed effects 𝑣𝑐 control for external macroeconomic shocks that are 
common across all subsector–counties, such as inflation or changes in exchange rates. 
While these fixed effects control for many possible unobserved confounders, certain time-variant 
effects might still bias 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. To reduce such biases, we control for subsector–county-wide 
covariates 𝑋𝑠𝑐𝑐, subsector-wide covariates 𝑋𝑠𝑐, and county-wide covariates 𝑋𝑐𝑐, which change over 
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time. For subsector–county-wide covariate 𝑋𝑠𝑐𝑐, we control for factory density, defined as the 
number of factories in subsector 𝑠 per 10,000 residents in county 𝑐. This variable captures the level 
of agglomeration or congestion of factories in a subsector–county–year. For subsector-wide 
covariates 𝑌𝑠𝑐, we include the share of Japanese factories, gross entry rate, and number of factories 
in a subsector. These variables capture the stage of development and the degree of entry barriers for 
Korean factories in each subsector. Alternatively, we can control for subsector-specific time trends 
(which are common across counties) by including the interactions of subsector dummies and year 
dummies. This deals with all temporal shocks common across factories within subsectors, such as 
increases in demand. Finally, county-wide covariates 𝑍𝑐𝑐 include the population growth rate, which 
addresses changes in local demand. Alternatively, we can include county–year dummies that control 
for county-specific trends (common across subsectors) driven by other county–year specific shocks 
such as connection to a railway.  
 
4.2. Data  
The data on factories are obtained from the Chosen Kojo Meibo (Register of Korean Factories) 
edited by the Governor-General of Korea (1934, 1938, 1941). We use the 1934, 1938, and 1941 
editions, which provide information for 1932, 1936, and 1940, respectively. The data cover all 
manufacturing factories in Korea that hold equipment requiring five or more workers or that employ 
five or more workers. For each factory, the data provide the address, factory name, owner name, and 
main product. Data for 1934 and 1936 also include the date of establishment and number of 
employees in intervals. Population data are obtained from the Annual Statistics published by the 
Governor-General of Korea (1934, 1938, 1942).  
Provinces (do) were the primary administrative unit in Korea under Japanese colonial rule, with 
each province divided into cities (fu) or counties (gun). We use city–counties (hereafter, “counties” 
for short) as a primary regional unit of observation. In 1932, there were 234 counties in 13 provinces. 
We fix the county borders in 1932 to construct consistent boundaries throughout the period of 
study11. On the basis of the owner’s name, we categorize the nationality of factories as Japanese, 
Korean, and other or unknown nationality. Most names belonged to individuals, but some were those 
of corporations. We categorize factories with corporate owners as unknown nationality as we were 
unable to identify the nationality from the corporate name. We classify each factory into one of 77 
subsectors on the basis of the factory’s main product. We also attach a sector code that aggregates 
subsectors into 10 sectors. The sector categories are the same as in the original data, but given the 
inconsistencies of sectors and main products across years in the original data, we use our sector 
coding for uniformity.  
The primary unit of observation is subsector–county–year. There are 77 subsectors and 234 
                                                        
11 Six counties were split into a city and a county during the years of observation (1932-1940). 
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counties. We dropped seven subsectors, which are bundles of factories that we are unable to code as 
belonging to a specific subsector because the main product registered is vague, as well as the gas and 
electricity subsector (which comprises one sector). Next, we dropped six counties that do not have 
factories, leaving us with 66 subsectors (nine sectors) and 228 counties. We also dropped subsector–
county pairs without factories throughout our observations, leaving us with 1,805 pairs. As we take 
differences over time to construct entry rates, we can only utilize observations for two out of three 
periods. The final number of observations is therefore 1,805 × 2 = 3,610 subsector–county–years.  
To construct the entry rates, we employ the following definition of percentage changes:  
 EntryRate𝑠𝑐𝑐 = 𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐 − 𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐−112 (𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐 + 𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐−1), 
 
where 𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐 is the number of factories in subsector 𝑠 in county 𝑐 in period 𝑡. This measure is 
frequently used when dealing with discrete changes that can be very large (see, for example, Kosová, 
2010; Roberts and Key, 2008). Using this measure rather than the “standard” one (i.e., (𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐 −
𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐−1)/𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐−1) allows us to avoid an infinite growth rate when 𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐−1 = 0. When no factories 
existed in both the previous and present periods, we define the entry rate as zero. Note that this is the 
gross entry rate, which also deducts the number of exits. Thus, an increase in the entry rate is 
affected by a rise in net entry rate and a decline in net exit rate.  
The share of Japanese factories is defined as the number of Japanese factories over the total 
number of factories in each subsector–county–year. For subsector–county–years with no Japanese 
factories, we set the variable to zero.  
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in the regression as well as additional 
variables for reference at the subsector–county–year. Table 2 reports the profile of each subsector 
with certain key indicators. Some observations concerning variations between subsectors are worth 
noting with respect to the analysis. First, a substantial variation was found in the total number of 
factories. While some subsectors, such as those manufacturing other liquors (mostly traditional 
Korean liquor), flour and grain mills (mostly rice milling), apparel, animal fat and oils (mostly 
sardine oil), and product machinery had more than 400 factories, other subsectors, such as those 
manufacturing malt liquor (beer), sugar, tea, livestock products, cotton spinning, petroleum and coal, 
and aircraft and parts had fewer than five factories.  
 
== Table 1. Summary statistics (subsector–county–year level) == 
== Table 2. Profile of subsectors == 
 
Second, variations in regional dispersion of factories were also observed. Factories were localized 
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in a small number of counties. In 1940, each subsector had a factory in 22 counties on average (9.3% 
of all 234 counties). Korean factories were less dispersed and were found in only 12 counties (5.3%). 
Table 2 suggests that equipment industries or high-tech industries such as the subsectors of malt 
liquors, sugar, tea, cotton spinning, miscellaneous spinning and woven products, chemical fertilizers, 
drugs and medicines, petroleum and coal products, abrasive products, miscellaneous chemical 
products, electrical machinery, equipment and supplies, electric bulbs and lighting fixtures, railroad 
equipment and parts, and aircraft and parts were localized in a maximum of four counties in 1940. 
On the other hand, factories in subsectors such as other liquors and flour and grain mills were 
observed in more than half the counties. Factories manufacturing Japanese sake, seasoning, woven 
fabric, lumber and wood products, printing, pottery and related products, structural clay products, 
fabricated metal products, and production machinery were also dispersed over more than 20% of the 
counties. This list suggests that subsectors producing daily and universal products were relatively 
ubiquitous across regions.  
Third, the share of Japanese factories also exhibited a wide variation. Some subsectors such as 
malt liquors, sugar, tea, cotton spinning, chemical fertilizers, petroleum and coal products, and 
aircraft and parts were dominated by Japanese factories in 1940, while more than 60% of the 
factories in subsectors of other liquors, flour and grain mills, woven fabric, knit fabric, drugs and 
medicines, pulp, paper and paper products, rubber products, and pottery and related products were 
Korean owned.  
Subsector-level variations over total number of factories, regional dispersion, and share of 
Japanese factories are inter-related: oligopolistic subsectors (subsectors with a small number of 
factories) tend to be highly localized and predominantly occupied by Japanese factories12. Since 
oligopolistic subsectors are more likely to be localized in limited counties, new entry is highly likely 
in these counties. To take such tendencies into account, we control for the subsector-wide total 
number of factories in the regression as well as omit oligopolistic or highly localized subsectors for 
our robustness check.  
 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Main results: Entry patterns within subsectors 
 
== Table 3. Japanese presence and Korean entry: Subsector–county level == 
 
                                                        
12 Subsector–year-level correlation coefficient of total number of factories and the percentage of counties with any 
factories is 0.7638 (𝑝 < 0.001,𝑁 = 198), suggesting that oligopolistic subsectors tend to localize in few counties. 
Also, the correlation coefficient of total number of factories and the share of Japanese factories is −0.3633 (𝑝 <0.001,𝑁 = 198), suggesting that oligopolistic subsectors are predominantly occupied by Japanese factories.  
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In this section, we present our main results. We employ observations by subsector–county to 
exploit variations across counties within subsectors. Table 3 reports the fixed effects estimates of 
equation (1). All estimates include a subsector–county fixed effect, and we cluster standard errors by 
subsector–county. Column (1) reports the result without controls. We sequentially add subsector–
county-wide, subsector-wide, and county-wide covariates that change over time from columns (2) to 
(6). Column (2) controls for the subsector–county-year covariate of factory density. Columns (3) and 
(4) control for subsector-wide covariates; we add share of Japanese factories, gross entry rate of all 
factories, and total number of factories in the same subsector in column (3) and subsector-specific 
time trends (subsector–year dummies) in column (4). We add county-wide covariates (population 
growth rate) in column (5) and county-specific time trends (county–year dummies) in column (6). As 
the number of entries by Korean factories in each subsector–county–year is small, we also report the 
estimate of a linear probability model, regressing a dummy indicating the gross entry of Korean 
factories in column (7).  
We consistently find a positive and significant coefficient of the lagged share of Japanese factories 
for all specifications. The result in column (6), with all controls, shows that an increase in the lagged 
share of Japanese factories from 0 to 10% leads to a 9.1 percentage point higher entry rate of Korean 
factories. The magnitude is large, roughly doubling the average gross entry rate from 0.116 to 0.207. 
The linear probability estimate in column (7) shows that this change increases the probability of 
Korean entry by 2.9 percentage points, an 11.6% increase from 24.9%. The coefficients of the 
synchronous gross entry rate of Japanese factories are also all significantly positive, but their 
magnitude is considerably smaller than that of the lagged share: a 10 percentage point increase leads 
to a 1.5 percentage point higher gross entry rate.  
For other controls, we find that entry rates are lower when factory density is higher, suggesting 
that negative spillovers appear in congested situations. On the other hand, Korean entry rates are 
higher in subsectors that have higher increases in Japanese presence and that are rapidly growing as 
well as in counties with higher population growth.  
In column (8), we examine whether the presence of large-scale factories serves as entry barriers. 
Large-scale factories are likely to be more productive due to scale economies and advanced 
technology; therefore, they are likely to discourage entry of small-scale indigenous factories. We add 
a dummy variable indicating if a subsector–county–year has a large-scale factory of any nationality 
with more than 100 workers in the same subsector. The coefficient of the large-scale dummy is 
negative but statistically insignificant.  
We briefly discuss the results that investigate entry patterns by using subsector–year, which has 
been conventionally analyzed in previous entry spillover studies, as the unit of observations. This 
analysis provides useful insights from variations between subsectors, implicitly assuming that entry 
spillovers occur at the subsector level over the entire Korean Peninsula. Table 4 reports the estimates 
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of the subsector-level version of equation (1). We report robust standard errors clustered by 
subsector.  
 
== Table 4. Japanese presence and Korean entry: Subsector level == 
 
A simple pooled-OLS estimate in column (1) indicates that the gross entry rate of Korean factories 
is higher in subsectors with higher lagged shares and higher gross entry rates of Japanese factories. 
Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. Considering the difficulty of entry, we 
expect that subsectors requiring large investments are harder to enter. In column (2), we add the 
lagged share of large factories with more than 100 workers, expecting a negative coefficient; the 
coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. In column (3), we include a subsector fixed 
effect to eliminate subsector-specific differences that affect Korean entry. For example, rapidly 
growing subsectors may induce intensive entries of factories irrespective of factory nationality. The 
fixed-effect estimates of Japanese presence and entry in column (3) are both positive, but the 
coefficients of the lagged share of Japanese factories are now marginally significant (𝑝 = 0.07).  
To summarize, we find that within the same subsector, Korean factories were likely to enter 
counties with higher presence or entry of Japanese factories. Subsector-level analyses also indicate 
that Korean entries were more active in subsectors with higher presence or entry of Japanese 
factories. These results imply that the advance of Japanese factories did not suppress Korean entry. 
In fact, Japanese factories probably acted as a catalyst for Korean industrialization.  
 
5.2. Robustness checks 
In this subsection, we conduct robustness checks of our main results. The results are reported in 
Table 5, with column (1) reporting the “base” result of column (8) in Table 3 as reference.  
 
== Table 5. Robustness checks == 
 
First, we use the standard entry rate to calculate the gross entry rate of Korean factories as 
discussed in section 4.2. To avoid infinite entry rates, we set the number of factories in 𝑡 − 1 to one 
when the entry rate is zero; thus, even if the number of Korean factories increased from zero to one, 
we regard the entry rate as zero. The result reported in column (2) shows that the main results are 
qualitatively similar.  
Second, in column (3), we control for presence and entry of “Other” factories, including 
corporate-owned factories. While we are unable to identify the nationality of these corporate-owned 
factories, they could be owned by Japanese corporates, and omitting these factories might bias our 
estimates. The result indicates that our results on Japanese presence and entry are robust to the 
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inclusion of “Other” factories. The estimates also suggest that the presence of “Other” factories is 
positive and significantly correlated with Korean entry.  
Third, we test the robustness of the samples’ limitations. In column (4), we drop Keijo-fu (now 
Seoul), which has been the center of economic activity, to check whether the results are driven by 
observations from this region. In column (5), we drop subsectors without any Korean factories 
throughout our observations, as Korean factories might have been prohibited from entry in some 
subsectors for political or military reasons. In cases wherein such prohibition occurred locally, we 
drop subsector–counties without any Korean factories throughout our observations in column (6). 
Column (7) omits oligopolistic subsectors with the total number of factories lower than the first 
quartile in 1940 (59 factories), and column (8) drops localized subsectors whose number of counties 
with any factory is lower than the first quartile in 1940 (19 counties). The results are robust to these 
limitations of the samples.  
Fourth, since our classification by subsectors based on the main product might include 
classification errors, we re-estimate equation (1) using a larger classification: sectors. We control for 
sector–year dummies instead of subsector–years for this specification. The result reported in column 
(9) is qualitatively similar, but the magnitudes of the coefficients of Japanese presence and entry are 
larger compared to the results using classification by subsectors. Since the classification by sectors 
includes factories in neighboring subsectors, this is likely caused by capturing vertical spillovers.  
Finally, in columns (10) and (11), we test if the lagged presence of Japanese factories has diverse 
effects on entry between Korean and Japanese factories. While we include fixed effects for 
subsector–county–year and control for subsector- and county-specific trends, there might still be 
omitted variables that affect both Korean entry and Japanese presence or entry. However, if the 
lagged Japanese presence affects only Korean factories, then we can rule out the possibility of 
spurious correlation. Interestingly, the results indicate that while the lagged Japanese presence is 
positively correlated with entry of Korean factories, its effect on Japanese entry is negative. This 
suggests that even if omitted variables exist, such effects tend to underestimate our results. 
 
5.3. Heterogeneity of the effects of Japanese presence and entry 
In this subsection, we examine the heterogeneity of the effects of Japanese presence and entry on 
Korean factories.  
 
== Table 6. Heterogeneity of the entry spillovers == 
 
We begin by examining the prediction that subsectors requiring large capital investments are more 
difficult to enter; therefore, entry spillovers, if any, would be smaller. We define 39 subsectors that 
have at least one factory employing more than 100 workers in 1936 as “large-scale” subsectors. The 
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remaining 27 subsectors without such large factories are considered as “small-scale” subsectors13. 
Columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 report estimates for large- and small-scale subsectors, respectively. 
While the coefficient of the lagged Japanese presence is slightly smaller for large-scale subsectors 
than for small-scale subsectors, the coefficient of the synchronous Japanese entry is larger. Thus, we 
do not find clear tendencies of factories in large-scale subsectors facing stronger entry barriers.  
Next, we compare the coefficients between urban and rural counties. Urban counties might be 
easier for factories to enter for various reasons such as larger demand; better access to credit; and 
possible technology spillovers generated from economies of urbanization, i.e., positive spillovers 
from the diversity of subsectors. We define counties as “urban” if a county was a city (fu) in 1940 
and as “rural” otherwise. Columns (4) and (5) in Table 6 show that entry spillovers are larger in 
urban than in rural counties.  
In Table 7, we report results by sector. While differences exist in the coefficients’ magnitude and 
significance, we do not find negatively significant coefficients of Japanese presence and entry. We 
also find positively significant effects of Japanese presence in certain modern sectors such as 
chemicals, iron and steel, and machinery. This implies that even though Korean factories had 
difficulty entering these sectors, when they did enter, they were likely to enter counties with 
Japanese incumbents.  
 
== Table 7. Japanese presence and Korean entry by sector == 
 
 
6. Discussion: Channels of positive entry spillovers 
Why were Korean factories more likely to enter counties with higher presence of Japanese 
factories? In this section, we interpret the results and discuss the channels of positive entry spillovers 
with historical anecdotes drawn from particular industries.  
 
6.1. Spinning and weaving industry 
The spinning and weaving industry, which is a modern industry, did not exist in pre-colonial 
Korea. The concept of producing cotton products in a mechanized factory was instituted by Japanese 
firms during the colonial period (Ahn, 2004: 95). While the indigenous cotton industry was 
reorganized as a side business for farmers, the spinning and weaving industry as a modern factory 
system saw significant direct investment from Japanese corporations. Since 1934, there has been a 
                                                        
13 Small-scale subsectors include other liquors; sugar; tea; soft drinks; livestock products; seafood products; 
miscellaneous foods; salt; other spinning; knit fabrics; furniture and fixtures; bookbinding; industrial organic 
chemicals; vegetable fat and oil; drugs and medicines; abrasive products; glass and products; non-ferrous metals and 
products; electrical machinery; equipment and supplies, primary batteries; electric bulbs and lighting fixtures; 
miscellaneous transportation equipment; shipbuilding and repairing; marine engines; hats; sundry goods such as 
tatami mats; bones, horns, hoofs, turtle shell, ivory, and shell products; and paper products. 
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four-corporation regime comprising Japanese-owned Chobang, Kanebo, and Toyobo and 
Korean-owned Kyǒngbang14. These four corporations produced most of the cotton yarn and cotton 
textiles for the Korean domestic market and successfully displaced the imported versions produced 
by Japan (Fukuoka, 2008: 190). In this context, Korean-owned Kyǒngbang became a successful new 
entrant into the spinning and weaving industry, in which Japanese capital was dominant.  
Joo (2002) explains how industry latecomers, Japanese-owned Chobang and Korean-owned 
Kyǒngbang, achieved growth using the advantage of backwardness. According to him, Chobang, one 
of the first entrants into the Korean market, was an industry latecomer in Japan compared with other 
major spinning and weaving corporations, and its objective was to catch up with these corporations. 
Kyǒngbang, created in response to Japanese entry into Korea, was a further latecomer, entering after 
Chobang, and its aim was to catch up first with Chobang and then with other big Japanese spinning 
and weaving corporations (Joo, 2002: 96).Technology transfer from Japanese corporations played an 
important role in Kyǒngbang’s development. The company installed its first power looms, purchased 
from Toyoda in 1922, and imported 224 automatic looms, the newest and best equipment available at 
the time, from Nogami in 1933 (Eckert, 1991: 146). Kyǒngbang actively pursued the use of 
cutting-edge technology not only in the form of machinery but also in the form of knowledge by 
inviting Japanese engineers to its factories and sending its engineers to Japanese corporations for 
training15. 
 
6.2. Rice-milling industry 
The rice-milling industry in 1930, with Korean-owned factories comprising 34% of the total 
industry, led the growth of Korean capital through the mid-1930s 16. The Korean traditional 
rice-milling industry was created by farmers who processed rice directly for domestic consumption. 
When the mass export of rice to Japan began, however, the process of turning rice kernels to white 
or brown rice by removing the husks was separated from rice cultivation, and the rice-milling 
industry became a factory-based industry. The number of Korean-owned factories in the rice-milling 
industry had already surpassed that of Japanese-owned factories in the 1920s, and it was consistently 
more than double that of Japanese-owned factories through the 1930s17.  
                                                        
14 The official names of these companies are Chosun Spinning and Weaving Company, Kanegafuchi Spinning and 
Weaving Company, Tōyō Spinning and Weaving Company, and Kyǒgsǒng Spinning and Weaving Company, 
respectively. 
15 The factors that brought about Kyǒngbang’s success include the active introduction of technology from Japanese 
spinning and weaving corporations, development of low-end markets, and highly developed managerial ability of the 
Kim family (Kyǒngbang’s management). In particular, the management of Kyǒngbang became the new Korean elite, 
receiving their university education in Japan, learning to capture business opportunities, and gaining the ability to 
organize and run the corporation (Joo, 2008: 352). 
16 Although the number of Korean rice-milling factories increased throughout the 1930s, their market share fell 
below 20% in 1940, implying that in colonial Korea, the speed of growth of other industries significantly exceeded 
that of the rice-milling industry. 
17 The Japanese-owned factories were larger in terms of capital, engines, and production, but the gap gradually 
narrowed throughout the 1930s. 
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Japanese rice merchants were the first entrants in Korea’s rice-milling industry. They used 
equipment brought from Japan at the end of the nineteenth century to process brown rice and then 
export it to Japan18. In the 1900s and early 1910s, they introduced rice-milling machinery from 
Japan and established the mechanized rice-milling industry in Korea. The industry was a large-scale 
mechanized factory-based operation, with oil-based generators and steam engines—and later electric 
motors and gas engines—used as power sources. This mechanized rice-milling industry killed off the 
indigenous milling industry in Korea, but Korean rice merchants started to emerge; they actively 
introduced milling technology and machinery from Japanese-owned factories and established 
numerous milling factories. There were also many instances wherein Korean employees of 
Japanese-owned rice-milling factories became independent and set up new rice-milling factories19. 
In both Japanese- and Korean-owned factories, a common method of market entry was for an 
employee of a milling factory to become independent and set up a new factory (Lee, 2010: 47-49). 
 
6.3. Knitting industry 
The knitting industry is a representative industry with no major Japanese capital and in which 
medium and small Korean-owned factories have outperformed Japanese businesses20. The growth of 
the Korean knitting industry resulted from the expansion of the domestic market and was deeply 
rooted in lifestyle changes. As Western lifestyle started to spread rapidly from the 1920s onward, the 
demand for rubber shoes, and socks as a complementary good, increased exponentially. The high 
demand for socks was first met by imports from Japan and then gradually by domestic production. 
Early sock factories were established with loaned Japanese merchant machinery, yarn, and 
technology. As the demand for socks grew, however, direct investment from Japan as well as the 
number of new Korean corporations entering the market increased. As a result, imported knitted 
material was completely displaced by domestically produced material in the mid-1920s (Joo, 1996: 
147-148). 
The knitting industry saw the most visible effects of technological spillover and spin-off from 
Japanese entry into the Korean market. The technology to produce knits spread from domestic 
factories organized by Japanese merchants even after the development of modern factories. Korean 
entrepreneurs invited engineers from Japanese-owned factories and sent their skilled workers to 
Japanese-owned factories to learn the technology. The development of the sock industry led to the 
development of related industries such as sock needles and dyeing. At the time, the production of 
                                                        
18 For example, Sadajiro Okuda, a typical rice merchant, brought 30 brown rice mills from Sakai, Japan and started a 
mechanical rice-milling business in the fall of 1890 (Lee, 2010: 47). 
19 Sun-Gyun Kim, a Korean rice merchant, worked at Okuda Rice Milling factory as an interpreter for the Japanese 
rice merchant Sadajiro Okuda. He later left the factory to set up his own rice-milling factory.  
20 The knitting industry includes knitted materials, knitted fabrics, and other products that use such fabric. Knitted 
material stretches well and is therefore used for several everyday clothing items such as socks, underwear, gloves, 
and hats. 
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sock needles was dominated by a Japanese-owned factory called Toyo Senshin Kojo and a Korean 
entrepreneur, Sung-Yo Kim, who had learned the technology at the Japanese factory before setting 
up his own needle factory. As in this case, Korean entrepreneurs who started spin-offs occasionally 
achieved even greater technological innovation. Another Korean entrepreneur, Chang-Yoon Son, 
who also learned the technology in a Japanese-owned factory, almost monopolized domestic demand 
for sock dyeing using a technology that he developed (Joo, 1994: 110-111). 
 
6.4. Rubber industry 
The rubber industry was another industry in which Korean entrepreneurs were very active. In 
particular, Korean-owned rubber shoe factories experienced such rapid growth that they were 
competing with Japanese-owned factories by the 1930s. As with the knitting industry, the rubber 
industry developed as a result of the expansion of the domestic market, which was caused by 
lifestyle changes. The demand for rubber shoes grew more than 60-fold over 16 years, from 600,000 
pairs sold in 1921 to 37,000,000 pairs sold in 1937. This rapid expansion of demand led to an 
increase in imported rubber shoes from Japan as well as stimulation of the domestic manufacturing 
sector. As a result, several rubber shoe factories, both Japanese- and Korean- owned, were set up. 
The self-sufficiency rate of rubber shoe production in 1921 was below 20%, with most of the 
domestic demand met by imports; however, with the rapid growth of domestic production, the 
self-sufficiency rate reached almost 100% in 1933, implying that imports were successfully 
displaced by domestic production (Joo, 1997: 85-87). 
Korean-owned rubber shoe factories were concentrated in large cities such as Seoul, Pyongyang, 
and Pusan. Pyongyang’s rubber industry originated from the Toa Rubber Company, set up by a 
Japanese entrepreneur who brought equipment from Japan. Later, Japanese-owned corporations 
educated skilled Korean workers about the technology of rubber compounding and rubber 
production, and these workers later established separate rubber shoe manufacturing in Pyongyang. 
For example, Byoung-Doo Lee, who learned the technology used at a Japanese-owned rubber shoe 
factory, established the Jǒngchang Rubber Company and taught the technology to other skilled 
workers. Thus, rubber shoe manufacturing technology gradually spread throughout Pyongyang (Joo, 
1996: 158). Many examples of technological spillovers and spin-offs can be observed in the rubber 
industry in Pusan. Young-Joon Kim, a Korean entrepreneur, was originally a skilled worker at the 
Watanabe Rubber Factory in Kobe, Japan who returned to Pusan, Korea to set up a rubber factory. In 
the 1930s, he also established several rubber shoe factories outside Pusan and became a 
representative capitalist in the rubber industry in the Southern region (Lee, 1990: 226-227). 
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7. Conclusion 
In light of the debates on the origin of Korean industrialization and on the effects of direct 
investment by the Japanese during the colonial period, we examined whether the advance of 
Japanese factories into Korea suppressed the entry of Korean-owned factories during the period of 
rapid industrialization in the 1930s. To quantitatively investigate this, we exploited variations of the 
share of Japanese factories and their entry rates across counties within same subsectors by using the 
census of factories in Korea.  
After controlling for potential unobservable factors that might affect both Japanese presence or 
entry and Korean entry by fixed effects for subsector, year, and subsector- and county-specific time 
trends, we found that on average, within a subsector, gross entry rates of Korean factories were 
higher in counties with higher presence and entry of Japanese factories. This positive relationship 
was also found between subsectors. Our findings clearly counter the view that the advance of 
Japanese factories suppressed indigenous industrialization by Korean factories in the 1930s. Instead, 
the result suggests possible positive entry spillovers from Japanese factories. As concrete evidence of 
such spillovers, we identified cases of technology transfer and spin-offs from Japanese factories in 
several sectors, which acted as a catalyst for Korean entry. Our results indicate that FDI can exert 
positive spillovers on the entry of indigenous firms, even at a very early stage of industrialization.  
While our results suggest that on average, the advance of Japanese factories did not suppress the 
entry of Korean factories, it should be noted that negative spillovers did exist. For instance, some 
subsectors were dominated by Japanese factories, suggesting crowding-out or entry-barrier effects. 
Huh (1993) also notes that large factories were predominantly Japanese owned and Korean factories 
were likely to remain small. It is important to notice the variations between subsectors and to 
consider the limitations faced by Korean factories after entry, such as growth in scale or 
improvement in productivity.  
Another important issue that remains is distinguishing between horizontal and vertical spillovers, 
as the views that emphasize the negative effects of Japanese direct investment rest on the argument 
that such investment lacked organic linkages with the Korean economy. In column (9) of Table 5, we 
found larger spillovers when observations were aggregated at a wider sector level compared with 
those at a subsector level. We interpreted this as indicative evidence of vertical spillovers from 
neighboring subsectors. Further analysis is needed to more clearly disentangle horizontal and 
vertical spillovers, which requires the construction of an input–output table for the time. Such an 
exercise will further our understanding of the relationships between the advance of Japanese 
factories and Korean industrialization, which we leave for future research.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Total output by sector 
 
Source: Kim (2002:128) 
 
Figure 2. Number of factories 
 
Source: Huh (1993:125) 
Note: There is a break between 1928 and 1929 owing to a change in statistical standards. Prior to 1928, to qualify 
as factories, sites needed to have five or more regular employees, a motor, or an annual output of at least 5,000 yen. 
From 1929 onward, sites only needed to have five or more regular employees to count as factories. 
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Figure 3. Total annual Japanese investment into Korea 
 
Source: LTES estimate by Yuzo Yamamoto in Mizoguchi (1988)  
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Tables 
Table 1. Summary statistics (subsector–county–year level) 
 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Subsector-county characteristics
Gross entry rate of Korean factories 3610 0.116 1.113 -2 2
Lagged share of Japanese factories 3610 0.272 0.406 0 1
Gross entry rate of Japanese factories 3610 0.223 1.033 -2 2
Lagged factory density (number of factories per 10,000 residents) 3610 0.276 0.770 0 14.6
(Variables for reference)
Number of Japanese factories (1936 and 1940) 3610 1.6 5.0 0 122
Number of Korean factories (1936 and 1940) 3610 1.9 6.4 0 121
Number of Other factories (1936 and 1940) 3610 0.1 0.4 0 8
Total number of factories (1936 and 1940) 3610 3.5 10.2 0 244
Gross entry rate of all factories 3610 0.250 1.230 -2 2
Gross number of Korean factories entered 3610 0.232 6.195 -101 112
Dummy if gross entry of Korean factories 3610 0.249 dummy 0 1
Dummy if lagged presence of Japanese factories with 200+ workers 3610 0.020 dummy 0 1
Dummy if lagged presence of Japanese factories with 100+ workers 3610 0.022 dummy 0 1
Dummy if lagged presence of any factories with 200+ workers 3610 0.027 dummy 0 1
Dummy if lagged presence of any factories with 100+ workers 3610 0.048 dummy 0 1
Characteristics common across subsector–years
Lagged share of Japanese factories 3610 0.497 0.267 0 1
Gross entry rate of all factories 3610 0.220 0.444 -2 2
Lagged factory density (number of factories per 10,000 residents) 3610 225.4 306.6 0 1167
Characteristics common across county–years
Population growth rate 3610 0.145 0.274 -0.620 2.413
Dummy if urban (="city"(fu) ) in 1940 3610 0.306 0.461 0 1
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Table 2. Subsector Profiles 
 
 
Note: *Oil and fat products include soaps, synthetic detergents, surface active agents, and paints. 
 
Sector Subsector 1936 1940 1932 1936 1940 1932 1936 1940 1932 1936 1940 1932 1936 1940
Food Japanese sake 1.813 -0.085 94 164 174 84% 59% 63% 30 42 50 2 9 17
Food Malt liquors 0.000 0.000 0 2 2 0% 100% 100% 0 1 1 0 0 0
Food Other liquors 0.108 -0.368 462 500 463 16% 16% 31% 125 141 150 113 133 119
Food Seasonings 0.000 -0.091 116 104 107 69% 70% 73% 54 51 56 18 22 20
Food Sugar 0.000 0.000 1 1 1 100% 100% 100% 1 1 1 0 0 0
Food Tea 0.000 0.000 3 3 3 100% 100% 100% 2 2 2 0 0 0
Food Soft drinks -2.000 2.000 19 21 22 84% 100% 77% 9 10 18 1 0 3
Food Manufactured ice 0.000 0.000 18 23 25 61% 96% 92% 15 18 19 0 0 0
Food Flour and grain mills 0.046 -0.458 1167 1141 828 32% 31% 35% 121 131 123 110 120 106
Food Bakery and confectionery -0.105 0.909 72 78 132 82% 86% 80% 7 9 15 2 3 9
Food Canned food 0.444 -0.316 39 59 52 74% 78% 81% 20 27 26 3 5 3
Food Livestock products 0.000 0.000 2 1 3 50% 100% 67% 2 1 3 0 0 0
Food Seafood products 0.069 1.400 66 72 152 71% 79% 43% 10 13 19 2 4 8
Food Miscellaneous foods 0.667 -0.514 30 45 41 50% 47% 59% 21 22 21 10 15 8
Food Salt -0.341 -0.061 55 44 42 53% 61% 62% 14 10 11 4 4 3
Textile and apparel Silk reeling 0.471 -1.294 106 108 86 65% 55% 83% 45 45 46 5 11 8
Textile and apparel Spinning, cotton 0.000 0.000 1 3 3 100% 100% 100% 1 2 2 0 0 0
Textile and apparel Spinning, other 0.000 2.000 1 2 6 100% 100% 50% 1 2 6 0 0 2
Textile and apparel Woven fabric 1.371 0.530 40 145 285 25% 16% 21% 18 61 59 10 50 31
Textile and apparel Dyed and finished textiles 0.000 -0.667 14 16 29 71% 75% 90% 6 6 7 1 3 1
Textile and apparel Knit fabrics 1.077 1.298 7 12 64 57% 17% 27% 3 4 7 2 4 7
Textile and apparel Rope, nets, and lace 0.667 0.545 8 14 16 75% 71% 56% 6 7 11 2 4 6
Textile and apparel Cotton wadding -0.625 0.308 54 37 63 54% 62% 59% 19 22 31 10 6 6
Textile and apparel Miscellaneous spinning and woven products 2.000 0.667 1 5 6 100% 80% 67% 1 3 3 0 1 2
Textile and apparel Apparel 0.612 0.939 116 179 501 51% 46% 47% 18 22 33 11 18 25
Lumber and wood products Lumber and wood products 0.727 0.960 98 163 346 77% 71% 59% 23 33 68 13 16 46
Lumber and wood products Furniture and fixtures 0.754 0.213 79 118 137 75% 64% 59% 12 14 21 6 7 14
Printing Printing 0.527 -0.054 230 276 318 59% 57% 64% 55 55 57 38 47 46
Printing Bookbinding 0.222 -0.857 11 10 8 64% 50% 75% 2 1 2 1 1 1
Chemical Chemical fertilizers 0.000 0.000 3 3 7 100% 100% 100% 3 3 4 0 0 0
Chemical Feed and organic fertilizers 0.510 -0.623 261 475 336 17% 24% 40% 13 11 17 11 8 13
Chemical Industrial inorganic chemicals 0.000 2.000 14 13 47 93% 100% 87% 6 7 17 0 0 4
Chemical Industrial organic chemicals -0.667 0.000 10 11 14 50% 91% 93% 4 4 7 1 1 1
Chemical Vegetable fat and oil -2.000 2.000 4 9 36 50% 89% 44% 3 6 13 1 0 7
Chemical Animal fat and oil 0.747 -0.046 264 615 820 14% 19% 40% 11 18 24 9 15 19
Chemical Oil and fat products* -0.182 -0.222 23 20 20 70% 75% 80% 8 8 10 3 2 3
Chemical Drugs and medicines 0.800 0.963 11 17 31 18% 47% 35% 2 2 3 1 1 3
Chemical Pulp and paper 0.636 -0.173 92 185 170 3% 3% 9% 23 36 38 19 34 28
Chemical Petroleum and coal products 0.000 0.000 1 4 2 100% 100% 100% 1 3 2 0 0 0
Chemical Rubber products -0.057 0.000 58 46 50 29% 24% 32% 15 10 12 11 10 9
Chemical Leather tanning, leather products, and fur skins -0.235 0.378 45 32 57 56% 50% 58% 13 5 15 8 3 8
Chemical Abrasive products 0.000 2.000 5 4 8 100% 100% 88% 4 3 4 0 0 1
Chemical Miscellaneous chemical products 2.000 -0.667 0 9 11 0% 78% 91% 0 3 8 0 1 1
Ceramic, stone and clay products Pottery and related products -0.070 -0.432 178 163 121 8% 6% 18% 66 60 51 61 55 41
Ceramic, stone and clay products Glass and products 0.545 0.880 15 21 36 73% 67% 50% 5 7 10 3 4 7
Ceramic, stone and clay products Cement and products 1.000 1.294 37 32 56 84% 91% 68% 12 12 25 1 2 10
Ceramic, stone and clay products Miscellaneous ceramic, stone, and clay products 0.000 2.000 2 11 8 100% 100% 88% 2 4 2 0 0 1
Ceramic, stone and clay products Structural clay products 0.293 0.306 90 112 167 58% 56% 57% 35 35 57 19 21 38
Iron and steel Iron and steel -1.389 0.842 84 20 67 23% 45% 55% 41 4 20 37 3 13
Iron and steel Non-ferrous metals and products 2.000 0.000 2 3 10 100% 67% 90% 1 1 6 0 1 1
Iron and steel Fabricated metal products 0.783 -0.496 133 237 214 48% 35% 55% 32 69 64 25 61 46
Machinery General-purpose machinery 1.200 0.222 13 19 45 92% 74% 87% 5 7 14 1 4 5
Machinery Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies 0.000 2.000 2 3 10 100% 100% 90% 1 1 3 0 0 1
Machinery Primary batteries 0.000 0.000 0 1 0 0% 100% 0% 0 1 0 0 0 0
Machinery Electric bulbs and lighting fixtures 2.000 0.435 0 18 27 0% 50% 48% 0 2 2 0 2 2
Machinery Production machinery 0.330 0.723 129 171 408 65% 64% 66% 31 32 55 19 21 36
Machinery Railroad equipment and parts 0.000 2.000 5 3 10 60% 100% 90% 3 1 3 0 0 1
Machinery Motor vehicles, parts, and accessories 0.824 0.154 17 33 59 59% 64% 75% 3 9 12 3 4 4
Machinery Miscellaneous transportation equipment 0.364 0.074 29 29 34 69% 55% 59% 12 11 17 6 7 10
Machinery Shipbuilding and repairing, and marine engines 2.000 1.000 50 58 75 96% 98% 91% 11 16 17 0 1 2
Machinery Business oriented machinery 0.667 0.000 6 8 17 67% 75% 76% 1 1 5 1 1 1
Machinery Aircraft and parts 0.000 0.000 0 0 1 0% 0% 100% 0 0 1 0 0 0
Other manufacturing Hats -0.286 0.800 7 6 14 43% 50% 50% 2 1 3 1 1 2
Other manufacturing Sundry goods such as tatami mats. 2.000 0.364 15 29 41 93% 69% 63% 6 10 14 0 5 8
Other manufacturing Bones, horns, hoofs, turtle shell, ivory, and shell products -0.462 0.333 10 9 14 20% 44% 50% 3 4 4 2 2 2
Other manufacturing Paper products 1.556 -0.133 20 27 39 95% 70% 79% 5 4 7 1 2 5
Gross entry rate
of Korean factories
Total number 
of factories
Share of Number of counties
with any factories
Number of counties
with Korean factoriesJapanese factories
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Table 3. Japanese presence and Korean entry: Subsector–county level 
 
Note: Unit of observation is subsector–county–year. The dependent variable is gross entry rate (percentage change in the number of factories during t − 1 to t). Share 
of Japanese factories is set to zero if no Japanese factories were present in period t − 1. Robust standard errors clustered by subsector–county in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Linear
Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect probability Fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of Japanese factories (t − 1) 1.014*** 0.862*** 0.839*** 0.796*** 0.777*** 0.914*** 0.294*** 0.922***
(0.121) (0.116) (0.119) (0.124) (0.124) (0.131) (0.0467) (0.131)
Gross entry rate of Japanese factories 0.279*** 0.187*** 0.155*** 0.153*** 0.145*** 0.152*** 0.0477*** 0.151***
(0.0343) (0.0332) (0.0330) (0.0333) (0.0331) (0.0344) (0.0122) (0.0343)
Factory density (number of factories per 10,000 residents) (t − 1) -0.632*** -0.607*** -0.658*** -0.660*** -0.678*** -0.292* -0.676***
(0.132) (0.134) (0.107) (0.108) (0.0852) (0.125) (0.0847)
Dummy if factories with 100+ workers present (t − 1) -0.160
(0.189)
Subsector-wide covariates
Share of Japanese factories (t − 1) 0.771**
(0.268)
Gross entry rate of all factories 0.666***
(0.0630)
Total number of factories (t − 1) 0.000892
(0.000782)
County characteristics
Population growth rate 0.451***
(0.133)
Year = 1940 -0.244*** -0.196*** -0.211*** -0.0642 -0.0874 -0.713* -0.196*** -0.676*
(0.0434) (0.0418) (0.0441) (0.193) (0.195) (0.328) (0.0277) (0.332)
Constant -0.100* 0.112* -0.604** 0.0655 0.0185 0.291 0.322*** 0.254
(0.0392) (0.0550) (0.225) (0.154) (0.153) (0.176) (0.0665) (0.162)
Subsector-county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsector × 1940 dummy No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County × 1940 dummy No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
N 3610 3610 3610 3610 3610 3610 3610 3610
R-sq 0.044 0.107 0.162 0.234 0.239 0.369 0.319 0.369
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Table 4. Japanese presence and Korean entry: Subsector-level 
 
Note: Unit of observation is subsector-year. The dependent variable is gross entry rate (percentage change in the number of factories during t-1 to t). Share of 
Japanese factories are set to zero if there were no Japanese factories in period t-1. Robust standard errors clustered by subsector in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
*** p<0.001 
(1) (2) (3)
Share of Japanese factories (t − 1) 0.866** 0.864** 1.538
(0.255) (0.257) (0.868)
Gross entry rate of Japanese factories 0.408** 0.406** 0.361*
(0.141) (0.142) (0.155)
Share of factories with 100+ workers (t − 1) -0.0301 0.712
(0.142) (0.616)
Total number of factories (t − 1) -0.0000906 -0.0000658 -0.00695**
(0.000193) (0.000231) (0.00247)
Year = 1940 -0.0475 -0.0422 -0.0891
(0.159) (0.158) (0.175)
Constant -0.303 -0.299 -0.310
(0.199) (0.201) (0.614)
Subsector FE No No Yes
N 132 132 132
R-sq 0.129 0.129 0.168
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Table 5. Robustness check. 
 
Note: Unit of observation is subsector–county–year (sector–year for column (9)). The dependent variable is gross entry rate (percentage change in the number of 
factories during t − 1 to t). Share of Japanese factories is set to zero if no Japanese factories were present in period t − 1. Base result in column (1) replicates the result 
in column (8) in Table 3. “Oligopolistic” subsectors are those with a total number of factories lower than the first quartile in 1940 (59 factories). “Localized” 
subsectors are those whose number of counties with any factory is lower than the first quartile in 1940 (19 counties). Robust standard errors clustered by subsector–
county in parentheses (sector–county for column (9)). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Subsectors Subsector-
With presence counties Without Without Aggregation
"Standard" and entry of Without "oligopolistic" "localized" by Korean Japanese
Base entry rate Other factories Keijo only only subsectors subsectors sector factories factories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Share of Japanese factories (t − 1) 0.922*** 1.054** 0.994*** 0.863*** 0.957*** 1.712*** 0.967*** 0.970*** 1.089*** 0.508*** -2.752***
(0.131) (0.340) (0.133) (0.132) (0.137) (0.283) (0.160) (0.162) (0.214) (0.0961) (0.0847)
Gross entry rate of Japanese factories 0.151*** 0.220* 0.148*** 0.125*** 0.153*** 0.217*** 0.133*** 0.108** 0.219***
(0.0343) (0.101) (0.0343) (0.0345) (0.0349) (0.0526) (0.0396) (0.0395) (0.0485)
Share of Other factories (t − 1) 0.731***
(0.198)
Gross entry rate of Other factories 0.00421
(0.0464)
Factory density (number of factories per 10,000 residents) (t − 1) -0.676*** -4.686*** -0.682*** -0.686*** -0.678*** -0.688*** -0.685*** -1.251*** -0.353*** -0.747*** -0.471***
(0.0847) (0.883) (0.0861) (0.0814) (0.0849) (0.0824) (0.0750) (0.198) (0.0822) (0.0864) (0.0420)
Dummy if factories with 100+ workers present (t − 1) -0.160 -1.134 -0.175 -0.239 -0.131 -0.155 0.0517 0.235 -0.536** -0.204 -0.290*
(0.189) (0.984) (0.188) (0.207) (0.200) (0.346) (0.239) (0.240) (0.200) (0.192) (0.134)
Year = 1940 -0.676* -2.104 -0.612 0.616 -0.714* -1.005 -0.921 -0.822 -0.838** -0.746* -0.469*
(0.332) (1.192) (0.338) (0.321) (0.345) (0.600) (0.483) (0.421) (0.272) (0.338) (0.220)
Constant 0.254 2.290*** 0.242 -0.350 0.163 0.611* 0.601* 0.651* 0.583** 0.601** 1.335***
(0.162) (0.588) (0.186) (0.186) (0.223) (0.256) (0.304) (0.295) (0.215) (0.193) (0.140)
Subsector-county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsector × 1940 dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County × 1940 dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3610 3610 3610 3500 3522 2390 2714 2728 1820 3610 3610
R-sq 0.369 0.448 0.374 0.379 0.371 0.465 0.418 0.413 0.420 0.362 0.610
Dependent variable:
Gross entry rate of 
with Korean factories
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Table 6. Heterogeneity of the effects of Japanese presence and entry 
 
Note: Unit of observation is subsector–year. The dependent variable is gross entry rate (percentage change in the number of factories during t − 1 to t). Share of 
Japanese factories are set to zero if no Japanese factories were present in period t − 1. Base result in column (1) replicates the result in column (8) in Table 3. 
“Large-scale” subsectors are those with at least one factory employing more than 100 workers in 1936 (39 subsectors). “Small-scale” subsectors are those without 
any factories employing more than 100 workers in 1937 (27 subsectors). “Urban” counties are those categorized as a city (fu) in 1940. Robust standard errors 
clustered by subsector–county in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
"Large-scale" "Small-scale" Urban Rural
Base subsectors subsectors counties counties
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of Japanese factories (t − 1) 0.922*** 0.912*** 0.977** 1.527*** 0.562**
(0.131) (0.144) (0.361) (0.217) (0.171)
Gross entry rate of Japanese factories 0.151*** 0.149*** 0.112 0.274*** 0.0670
(0.0343) (0.0388) (0.0893) (0.0565) (0.0445)
Factory density (number of factories per 10,000 residents) (t − -0.676*** -0.644*** -2.756*** -1.102*** -0.668***
(0.0847) (0.0669) (0.746) (0.223) (0.0783)
Dummy if factories with 100+ workers present (t − 1) -0.160 -0.121 0.0856 -0.401
(0.189) (0.189) (0.224) (0.298)
Year = 1940 -0.676* -0.827* -0.0188 -1.013** 0.782*
(0.332) (0.372) (0.950) (0.385) (0.391)
Constant 0.254 0.198* 0.250 0.520 -0.461
(0.162) (0.0865) (0.821) (0.330) (0.287)
Subsector-county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsector × 1940 dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County × 1940 dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3610 2732 878 1106 2504
R-sq 0.369 0.418 0.628 0.346 0.421
35 
 
Table 7. Japanese presence and Korean entry by sector 
 
Note: Unit of observation is subsector–county–year. The dependent variable is gross entry rate (percentage change in the number of factories during t − 1 to t). Share 
of Japanese factories are set to zero if no Japanese factories were present in period t − 1. Base result in column (1) replicates the result in column (8) in Table 3. 
County × year dummies are omitted for column (5) owing to insufficient observations. Robust standard errors clustered by subsector–county in parentheses. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
Textile Lumber and Ceramic, Iron
Base Food and wood Printing Chemical stone, and and Machinery Other 
apparel products clay products steel manufacturing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Share of Japanese factories (t − 1) 0.922*** 0.857*** 0.265 0.770 1.998* 1.166** 0.490 2.916** 2.254*** 1.197
(0.131) (0.254) (0.382) (1.221) (0.777) (0.374) (0.451) (0.935) (0.646) (1.548)
Gross entry rate of Japanese factories 0.151*** 0.118 0.0225 -0.343 -0.00730 0.359** -0.105 0.266 0.223 -0.00377
(0.0343) (0.0650) (0.106) (0.272) (0.197) (0.118) (0.153) (0.165) (0.153) (0.161)
Factory density (number of factories per 10,000 residents) (t − 1) -0.676*** -1.569*** -1.681*** -2.939 -2.522*** -0.458*** -3.237*** -3.894*** -3.088*** -13.41***
(0.0847) (0.337) (0.395) (1.935) (0.643) (0.0695) (0.791) (0.786) (0.667) (2.225)
Dummy if factories with 100+ workers present (t − 1) -0.160 -0.195 0.926* -0.540 0.204 -0.343 0.0541
(0.189) (0.487) (0.360) (0.369) (0.678) (0.845) (0.578)
Year = 1940 -0.676* -0.262 -0.873 -1.194 -0.325 0.329 -0.610 0.0121 -1.316* -0.537
(0.332) (0.667) (1.054) (0.634) (0.224) (0.496) (0.866) (0.808) (0.527) (1.151)
Constant 0.254 0.298 0.747 2.549* 0.497 0.0155 1.178 0.0177 1.209* 1.787
(0.162) (0.430) (0.924) (1.016) (0.498) (0.521) (0.905) (0.928) (0.586) (1.618)
Subsector-county FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Subsector × 1940 dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County × 1940 dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3610 1270 520 200 128 438 386 292 314 62
R-sq 0.369 0.463 0.670 0.896 0.310 0.742 0.713 0.827 0.687 0.844
